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Recent Developments in the Use of Interstate
Water Compacts
BY GAIL L. IRFLAND*
I am especially pleased to have the opportunity to speak on the sub-
ject of Interstate Water Compacts, because of the fact that Colorado is a
party to five of the ten interstate water compacts now in operation and
effect in the United States. Ten other compacts among various states
have been formulated in recent years, but for various reasons they have
not yet become effective. Colorado at this time is making the necessary
studies and conducting negotiations for the formulation of two more
compacts, one on the Costilla River with New Mexico and one on the
Little Snake River with Wyoming. Obviously, the reason why Colo-
rado has been a pioneer and now is a leader in this activity is because the
headwaters of nearly every major stream in the United States arise in
Colorado and we haven't been able to devise any scheme to keep water
from flowing down hill.
In America's early years, the advisability and feasibility of such
compacts were recognized, as evidenced by the Virginia and Maryland
Agreement of 1785, the South Carolina and Georgia Agreement of
1788, and the New York and New Jersey Compact of 1833. Then for
eighty-three years not another interstate water compact was formulated
in the Uanited States.
Recent developments began with the signing of the Colorado River
Compact at Santa Fe, New Mexico, in 1922, allocating such waters and
defining the rights of the seven states in the river basin; namely, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. Con-
gress approved the compact in 1928 and the Boulder Canyon Project
.Act became effective in 1929 by presidential proclamation. Then fol-
lowed the La Plata River Compact between Colorado and New Mexico,
approved in 1925. Next was the South Platte River Compact between
Colorado and Nebraska, apprcved in 1926. Then Colorado, New Mex-
ico and Texas entered into the original Rio Grande River Compact in
1930, which was discontinued in 1937, but followed by the present Rio
*Attorney General of Colorado. Speech delivered before the National Association
of Attorneys General at Chicago, Illinois, November 15, 1943.
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Grande River Compact, approved in 1939. The Tri-state Compact, be-
tween New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, was approved in 1935,
the Pymatuning Lake Agreement between Pennsylvania and Ohio, ap-
proved in 1937, the Red River of the North Compact between North
Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota, approved in 1938, the Alamo-
gordo Reservoir Compact (a temporary agreement) between Texas and
New Mexico, ratified by Texas in 1939, the Potomac River Compact,
between Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, Pennsylvania and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, approved in 1940, and finally the Republican River
Compact between Colorado, Kansas and Nebraska, approved in 1943.
The original Republican River Compact had been ratified by the
three states in 1941, passed by both Houses of Congress, but vetoed by
the President in 1942.
Compacts formulated but not yet effective are:
1. Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact between
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Ten-
nessee and West Virginia, which will become effective when Penn-
sylvania ratifies,
2. Tri-state Compact (a supplemental compact to the Colo-
rado River Compact) between Arizona, California and Nevada.
3. Delaware River Compact (1925) between New York,
New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
4. Delaware River Compact (1927) between the same
states, but only New York ratified.
5. Connecticut River Compact (1937) between Massachu-
setts, Connecticut, New Hampshire and Vermont, rejected by Con-
gress.
6. Merrimack River Compact (1937) between Massachu-
setts and New Hampshire, rejected by Congress.
7,. Yellowstone River Compact (1935) between Wyoming
and Montana, not ratified by either state.
8. Snake River Compact (1933) between Wyoming and
Idaho, not ratified by Wyoming.
9. Canadian River Compact (1926) between New Mexico,
Texas and Oklahoma, not ratified by Texas.
10. Belle Fourche River Compact (1943) between South
Dakota and Wyoming, ratified by both states and now pending
approval in Congress.
Colorado has also been a party to more litigation in the United
States Supreme Court involving the allocation and use of the waters of
interstate streams than any other state in the Union and experience has
proved that the judicial process is often too fixed to meet changing social
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and economic issues in a given region made up of two or more states.
Too often litigation has resulted only in confusion, delayed development
and large expenditures of public funds and all too often ended with a
judicial decree which was unworkable and a breeder of further litigation.
There has been practically a continuous series of law suits between Kan-
sas and Colorado or their citizens over the waters of the Arkansas River
since 1901 and at this time the United States Supreme Court is attempt-
ing to decide a case of original jurisdiction between the two states. Con-
ditions resulting from forty-two years of bitter litigation have definitely
prevented, the two states compromising their differences by compact.
However, I feel that much more of a constructive nature could be accom-
plished in this case by compact, even at this late date, than either state
can ever expect to obtain by court decree. The North Platte River case.
also pending in the United States Supreme Court between Nebraska.
Wyoming, Colorado and the United States, is another example of years
of litigation, expenditures of enormous sums, and an ultimate court de-
cree which cannot possibly comprehend and equitably settle the dispute
as satisfactorily as could be done by compact. However, this is another
case where compact appears to be impossible.
Basic compact procedure was originally recognized by the Federal
Constitution, Section 10 (2) of Article I thereof, providing that:
"No state shall, without the consent of Congress * * * enter
into any agreement or compact with another state * *
This has been construed to mean definite authorization to compact, but
the authority is put in the negative so as to express the limitation imposed
upon its exercise.
Compacts are negotiated by commissioners appointed by the gover-
nors of the participating states, either under a special law for specific
negotiations or under general statutory provisions. The negotiated
compact signed by the commissioners must then be submitted to the
legislatures of the signatory states for ratification.
The validity of such compacts was sustained in the case of Hinder-
lider, et al. u. La Plata Rih'er and Cherry Creek Ditch Company. 320
U. S. 646 (1937). Important principles were therein recognized,
namely:
"(a) 'As each State is entitled only to an equitable share of
the water of an interstate stream, an adjudication decree in either
State cannot confer rights in excess of such share, and parties in
the other State are free to challenge claims that under the decree all
the water can be taken from the stream.'
" (b) 'Adjustment of controverted rights may be made by
compact without a judicial or quasi-judicial determination of exist-
ing rights, as well as by a suit in the Supreme Court. The Court
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has recommended that such matters be adjusted by compact, in
order to avoid the difficulties incident to litigation.'
"(c) 'Whether such apportionment be made by compact
with the consent of Congress, or by decree of the Supreme Court,
the apportionment is binding upon the citizens of each State and
upon all water claimants, even where the State had previously
granted water rights.'
"(d) 'The apportionment may provide either for a continu-
ous equal division of water or for rotation in use of the stream.'
"(e) 'As .no claimant has any right greater than the equitable
share to which the State is entitled, no vested right is taken away
by the apportionment if there was no vitiating infirmity in the pro-
ceedings leading up to the compact or in its application.'
"(f) 'The assent of Congress to a compact does not make it
a "treaty or statute of the United States" within the meaning of
the Judicial Code, so that a decision of a State court against its
validity is not appealable to the Supreme Court, nor is a claim based
on the equitable interstate apportionment of water the subject of
appeal. However, the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court
restraining the State engineer from taking action required by the
compact, denied an important claim under the Constitution, which
may be reviewed on certiorari. Whether the waters of an interstate
stream must be apportioned between two States presents a Federal
question, and the fact that the States are not parties to the suit does
not deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction.' "
It should be noted that in this case the question of whether or not
the compact made an equitable apportionment was not raised.
Two different methods of obtaining congressional consent have
been recognized. One procedure calls for passage of an act by Congress
granting its consent to make a compact. Then follows negotiation, state
legislative ratification and final submission to Congress for approval.
The other procedure eliminates congressional consent in the first instance
and final approval implies previous consent. In any event, the required
constitutional consent is not effectuated until the full text of the compact
is before Congress and approved by it.
Experience teaches us that previous congressional consent should be
obtained, especially where federal interests are involved, and should
therein designate, directly or through authorized appointment, a federal
representative to participate in the negotiations. It should be clearly
understood, however, that the states by following such procedures are
not waiving their right to compact originally or admitting that Congress
can curb and limit them in their legitimate activities.
DICTA 81
Adequate studies, joint investigations and thorough knowledge of
water resources involved, together with sound conclusions of the most
efficient use thereof, must be made prior to negotiating. It is also a neces-
sity that adequate administration provisions are written in any water
compact, with as much flexibility as possible to meet changing adminis-
tration conditions, provided, however, that powers cannot be delegated
to administrative officials which in their exercise would transcend specific
or implied compact terms. Changes in provisions can only be made by
unanimous approval of the signatory states with consent of Congress.
Adjustment of disputes can be encouraged in an extra-legal fashion (see
Article VI of the Colorado River Compact) by providing for appoint-
ment of commissioners to consider and adjust specified claims or contro-
versies, subject to legislative ratification. Periodic review of provisions by
administrative commissioners is most advisable, but should not cover ba-
sic principles upon which the compact is founded. I am not aware of any
case where there has been legislative interference in compact administra-
tion. An administrative commission should not be granted and from a
legal standpoint could not be given judicial functions such as the author-
ity to settle disputes on an interstate stream within the political and legal
concept of federal and state constitutions. Only the Supreme Court of
the United States can by appropriate action resolve interstate controver-
sies involving alleged failure to comply with compact terms on a question
of their interpretation. Therefore, a compact commission's powers must
necessarily be limited to those of an administrative nature.
More and more we find it necessary to correlate federal and state
interests in, and jurisdiction over, interstate waters. In some instances
certain federal as well as state jurisdiction must be recognized, and since
the federal government is not a necessary party to a compact, this can be
accomplished as was done through Articles X and XI of the recent Re-
publican River Compact, which provides as follows:
"ARTICLE X
"Nothing in this compact shall be deemed:
"(a) To impair or affect any rights, powers or jurisdiction
of the United States, or those acting by or under its authority, in,
over, and to the waters of the Basin; nor to impair or affect the
capacity of the United States, or those acting by or under its author-
ity, to acquire rights in and to the use of waters of the Basin;
" (b) To subject any property of the United States, its agen-
cies or instrumentalities, to taxation by any State, or subdivision
thereof, nor to create an obligation on the part of the United States,
its agencies or instrumentalities, by reason of the acquisition, con-
struction, or operation of any property or works of whatsoever
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kind, to make any payments to any State or political subdivision
thereof, state agency, municipality, or entity whatsoever in reim-
bursement for the loss of taxes;
" (c) To subject any property of the United States, its agen-
cies or instrumentalities, to the laws of any State to any extent other
than the extent these laws would apply without regard to this
compact.
"ARTICLE XI
"This compact shall become operative when ratified by the
Legislature of each of the States, and when consented to by the
Congress of the United States by legislation providing, among
other things, that:
"(a) Any beneficial consumptive uses by the United States,
or those acting by or under its authority, within a State, of the
waters allocated by this compact, shall be made within the alloca-
tions hereinabove made for use in that State and shall be taken into
account in determining the extent of use within that State.
"(b) The United States, or those acting by or under its
authority, in the exercise of rights or powers arising from what-
ever jurisdiction the United States has in, over, and to the waters
of the Basin shall recognize, to the extent consistent with the best
utilization of the waters for multiple purposes, that beneficial con-
sumptive use of the waters within the Basin is of paramount im-
portance to the development of the Basin; and no exercise of such
power or right thereby that would interfere with the full beneficial
consumptive use of the waters within the Basin shall be made
except upon a determination, giving due consideration to the ob-
jectives of this compact and after consultation with all interested
federal agencies and the state officials charged with the administra-
tion of this compact, that such exercise is in the interest of the best
utilization of such waters for multiple purposes.
"(c) The United States, or those acting by or under its
authority, will recognize any" established use, for domestic and
irrigation purposes, of the waters allocated by this compact which
may be impaired by the exercise of federal jurisdiction in, over, and
to such waters; provided, that such use is being exercised benefi-
cially, is valid under the laws of the appropriate State and in con-
formity with this compact at the time of the impairment thereof,
and was validly initiated under state law prior to the initiation or
authorization of the federal program or project which causes such
impairment."
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Therefore, supplemental federal legislation is absolutely necessary
to bind the United States and its agencies and instrumentalities. To date
we have no United States Supreme Court decision holding that mere
assent by the federal government and its agencies can in any way bind
it or them. The Boulder Canyon Project gives us ample precedent sup-
porting the power of Congress to effectuate the provisions of Article XI
of the Republican River Compact above set forth. I believe it a fair
statement to say that the particular formula worked out in the Republi-
can River Compact can and will serve as the most sensible and effective
method to be followed in compacts yet to be made in the various river
basins in attempting to prevent clashes between federal and state juris-
dictions. In fact, this formula has already been used in the Belle Fourche
Compact between Wyoming and South Dakota.
I~n a general way, it can be said that compacts of twenty-five years
ago, and until the last few years, have been very helpful in providing
for an amicable division of water between states and have eliminated
many causes which would otherwise have led to disputes and litigation.
However, in more recent years extremely troublesome and difficult prob-
lems have arisen because of the clash between federal and state jurisdic-
tions. Today we face multiple use projects in many basins, calling for
intelligent coordination of plans and programs of federal agencies en-
-aged in the work of water resource development. While domestic, irri-
gation and industrial uses of water are controlled and regulated in the
West by state laws, the control of water in the interest of navigation
comes under federal jurisdiction by virtue of the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution, and the recent interpretation of this clause by the fed-
eral courts, as well as its application by federal agencies under various
congressional acts, has been extended to cover flood control and hydro-
electric production. These developments, coupled with the fact that
future water projects, particularly in the West, will no doubt be fed-
erally financed, present most difficult problems to compose, and it is very
necessary that compact terms should be imposed on federal agencies and
that provisions be made insuring recognition by the federal government
of applicable state laws. Many interesting and intricate problems must
be faced and solved by the states of the Missouri River Basin when Con-
gress passes the recently introduced bill granting permission to negotiate
a compact in that basin.
A real and serious argument is brewing at this time which empha-
sizes the marked differences between federal and state viewpoints as to
procedure and subject matter of future compacts. The states insist, and
rightly so, that preservation of the integrity of state water laws is of
paramount importance, whereas the federal government, through certain
of its agencies and mouthpieces, insists that under no circumstances
should states even initiate negotiations without the consent of Congress
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being first secured; further, that federal participation in negotiations is
absolutely necessary, whether or not federal interests are involved, as well
as federal representation on the administrative commission when the
compact has been finally consummated. And finally, the federal theory
which is most dangerous and uncalled for, namely, that the federal gov-
ernment owns and has the exclusive right to control and administer all
of the unappropriated waters in our western states. This last federal
viewpoint, which to me is absolutely un-American and unconstitutional,
must be forever stubbornly and successfully resisted by every state.
In conclusion, permit me to make a personal observation which goes
to the very existence of our form of government. Regardless of what
state we are from or what our party politics may be, we are all deeply
and seriously concerned over the rapid development of centralized gov-
ernment and destruction of state's rights. If states were able to settle
interstate differences with reasonable dispatch and with a minimum of
litigation, the main excuse upon which the federal government relies to
inject itself into state's affairs and attempt to take over strictly state func-
tions would not arise. If our states are to maintain their quasi-sover-
eignty and independence, they must continue to demonstrate the fact
that they can shoulder their own responsibilities and get along in a
peaceful manner with each other.
To the seventeen western, so-called Reclamation States, water for.
beneficial consumptive use is their life blood. Judicial process cannot
envision future development programs and provide by a declaratory
judgment equitable apportionment of unused waters. The conference
table offers the only safe and intelligent solution.
A few years ago, while sitting as a lawyer-spectator in Justice Court
in a small mining town, presided over by a very Irish, and considerably
inebriated Justice of the Peace, I witnessed the following incident.
The justice had just finished listening to a civil case, without bene-
fit of jury, and in which neither of the contesting parties had counsel.
The evidence closed, the court declared a momentary recess while he
dipped his head behind his large desk, and took another nip from his
bottle there concealed. Straightening -up in his chair again, he declared
himself ready to announce his judgment.
"Judgment for the defendant," he said.
Whereupon the plaintiff jumped to his feet, and angrily said, "But
Judge, that isn't what you told me you were going to do last night at
your house."
The Judge replied, "Aw, ye make me tired. Court wasn't in session
when I told you that."
JAMES M. NOLAND in The Docket.
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I am talking about are those of Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts' of the
Supreme Court of the United States as they are discussed and expounded
(although not so designated) by Associate Justice Wiley Rutledge in
Some Premises of Peace2 and in The Rules of Ordera by Forrest Seymour,
of The Des Moines Register and Tribune, in the December, 1943, issue
of the Rocky Mountain Law Review.
I also chose to use Roberts' Rules of Order because Justice Roberts
happens to be a Republican and I a Democrat (Rutledge is a Democrat
and Seymour is a Republican), so it cannot be said that I am being actu-
ated by any feeling of partisan politics.
By now you are aware that I am speaking about rules of order for
the world. Most of the lawyers of Colorado remember that I was active
in an attempt to have the General Assembly of Colorado adopt a reso-
lution in favor of a Federation of the World. That body did not
adopt the proposed resolution but substituted therefor a half-hearted
statement on cooperation.
4
One of Justice Roberts' rules of order provides: "That the Presi-
dent of the United States submit to Congress a program for forming a
powerful union of free people to win the war, the peace, the future:
That this program unite our people on the broad lines of our Constitu-
tion with * * * other free peoples both in the Old World and New,
as may be found ready and able to unite on this federal basis * * *
so that from this nucleus may grow eventually a universal world gov-
ernment of, by and for the people." In this statement Justice Roberts
was joined by Grenville Clark, Gardner Cowles, Jr., Russell W. Daven-
port, John Foster Dulles (about whom I said on November 4, 1943,
that he would be the next Secretary of State if Thomas E. Dewey is
elected President, and who Walter Winchell recently said would be the
next Secretary of State regardless of whom is elected President in No-
vember), Harold L. Ickes, Harry G. Scherman, author of The Last Best
Hope of Earth,5 and William Jay Schieffelin.
I take it that every lawyer is now familiar with the Fulbright Res-
olution 7 which was adopted in the House of Representatives of the
United States September 21, 1943, by a vote of 370 to 29, pledging
itself to "the creation of appropriate international machinery with power
adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace among the
'Expressed in a number of addresses. See Supra-National Law, delivered at a din-
ner of the American Society of International Law, Washington, D. C., May 1, 1943.
9 VITAL SPEECHES 457 (May 15, 1943).
216 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW 1.
316 ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAW REVIEW 74.
'Senate Memorial No. 10. COLO. S. L. 1943, p. 718.
'New York, Random House, 1941. See, also, 168 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 567
(1941).
"The New York Times, December 18, 1941.
'House Concurrent Resolution 25, 78th Cong., 1st Session.
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nations of the word, and as favoring participation by the United States
therein," and the Connally Resolution, s which was approved by the
United States Senate November 5, 1943, by a vote of 85 to 5, provid-
ing: "That the United States acting through its constitutional processes
join with free and sovereign nations in the establishment and mainte-
nance of international authority with power to prevent aggression and
to preserve the peace of the world."
Conceding that these two resolutions may mean all things to all
men, I think it fair to say that both are comprehensive enough to permit
the formation of an "international authority" that can do the job that
has to be done.
"Justice Roberts, in following Mr. Streit, believes that the Ameri-
can people can assure the establishment of a world government if they
will declare that they want it. Their will in the matter will prevail.
Such a government would follow the form of the American Union. A
citizen of any country composing the union would be a citizen of any
other. His place of residence and occupation would be of his own choice.
The constitution of the union government would be the supreme law
and the union would be as firmly cemented as the union of American
states; * * *."--Chicago Daily Tribune, June 15, 1943, commenting
on Justice Roberts' speech of June 13, 1943.
What is the will of the American people in the matter? I suppose
in the last analysis that is anybody's guess, but here are a few indications:
The voters of the city of Boulder, Colorado, and those of the state of
Massachusetts in the general election of 1942, who had a chance to vote
on the question on a ballot as a part of the elections, expressed their will-
ingness to having the United States become a part of a world federal
union by a majority of more than three to one. In so far as the leaders of
the three great religious faiths speak for their followers, they are com-
mitted to the organization of "International institutions to maintain
peace with justice." In the March, 1944, issue of Fortune is a statement
of principles of authority which the American people are now ready to
grant to the proposed world government, a resume of which appeared in
the issue of Time for February 28, 1944. The most surprising poll of all,
however, is the recent one announced by the United States Chamber of
Commerce to the effect that out of a total of 1,935 ballots from its mem-
bers, 1,927 approved the four-nation declaration at Moscow and the
Fulbright and Connally resolutions, and 1,828 out of 1,899 approved
an international police force "acting through the combined chiefs of
staff organization developed to meet future conditions."
To those of you who may agree with Alexander Hamilton as to
the intelligence of the masses in such questions as these, assuming that
'Senate Resolution 192, 78th Cong., 1st Session.
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the Fortune poll was obtained from that source, i. e., a cross section of
the American people, I say that the change in the thinking is not con-
fined to the masses, but to many members of our profession as well.
This may be illustrated by a personal experience. In September, 1942,
at the annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association, when my friend
George M. Morris was president of the American Bar Association, I
suggested that he appoint a committee of that association to work in this
field. His curt reply was: "Let's win the war first," and he therewith
dismissed the suggestion. That he has had a change of heart is evidenced
by at least two actions on his part: The fact that Justice Rutledge was
asked to speak at the meeting of the American Bar Association in Chi-
cago (the speech he delivered there is the one which appears in the Rocky
Mountain Law Review, supra) and Mr. Morris' own speech which was
published in the March, 1944, issue of the University of Chicago Maga-
zine. However, most typical of the thinking of many leaders of the bar
today is that which is well expressed in Judge Orie L. Phillips' article
entitled Ordered Justice Under Law in an International Association' in
the February, 1944, number of the American Bar Association Journal.
Those of us who have known Judge Phillips through the years realize
the change in his thinking on the subject, which change he has been free
to confess. I commend his article to the serious consideration of the
members of the Colorado bar.
A constitution for the United States of the World has been drafted
by the very respectable League of Nations Committee in London. It
was published in the February, 1944, issue of International Conciliation,
copies of which may be had from the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 405 West 117th Street, New York, N. Y., and an interna-
tional bill of rights is in process of formation under a committee of the
American Law Institute, the director of which is William Draper Lewis
of the Philadelphia bar.
You may have no interest in these Roberts' Rules of Order. You
may only ask to be let alone to practice law in your own bailiwick,
which is a highly commendable thing to do, but this article is addressed
to those members of the bar who may wish to have some part in this
next great step in building a government under law for the world. That
it will be essentially a lawyer's task and duty needs no citation of
authority.
Maybe some lawyer in Colorado could win the $3,000 offered by
the American Bar Association for the best answer to the question:
"What Instrumentality for the Administration of International Justice
Will Most Effectively Promote the Establishment and Maintenance of
International Law and Order?"' 1
930 AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION JOURNAL 61.
1020 DICTA opp. p. 323 (December, 1943), 30 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
JOURNAL XI (No. 2, February, 1944).
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Young Men in the Law and Their Importance
to the Organized Bar
BY Guy RICHARDS CRUMP*
When I learned per Western Union of the subject assigned to me,
I was somewhat startled. It was:
"The Young Man in the Law and His Importance to the Organized
Bar."
Can it be, I thought, that the Junior Bar in Chicago has been so
completely depleted? But, if so, how chummy it will be with just two
of us, he presiding and listening with rapt attention or, calling himself
to order as the case may be, the speaker joining in the applause to give the
effect of unanimity.
It is an agreeable surprise to learn that Western Union was spoof-
ing. A typographical error, no doubt, like the needle in the soup.
Talking about the "importance" of young men to the organized
bar is not unlike discussing the importance of women in the life of a
nation. No women-no nation. No young men-no bar, organized or
disorganized.
Also, who is a young man? Intellectually, Oliver Wendell Holmes
was young at ninety. On the other hand we all know men young in
years, but fortunately not many, whose thoughts and ideals are mark-
edly decrepit. Having graduated from college and law school, their edu-
cation has been finished and eternity will not produce a new idea or a
new approach.
Fortuitously, or providentially, as you will, this is not true in
Babylon on the Potomac. There the young men in the law exude ideas
as readily as equatorial jungles exude miasmas-both equally deadly.
Young men on the bench do some exuding on their own account,
which leads one to enquire whether castor oil is altogether desirable as a
steady diet. Not but what it is necessary at times, but as someone said
of our two'political parties-one has no ideas and the other too damn
many. This may or may not be cryptic. I don't know, but it is not a
cliche, at least not an insidious cliche.
The prime desideratum of the bar today, it seems to me, is a restate-
ment of legal values. In this era of judicial flux, it is essential that we
have fixed values, even though they may not be perfect.
This is manifestly true of administrative agencies whose disregard
of values, aye, even of proprieties, both substantive and objective,
"smells to heaven."
*Chairman, House of Delegates, American Bar Association. Speech delivered be-
fore the younger members, Chicago Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 25,
1944.
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Granting the necessity for protestant reform, yet iconoclasm is
rightly but a phase, not the sure foundation for a creed. And right here
is the big job for the young men in the law as I see it. The greatest serv-
ice you can render is to think honestly concerning fundamental concepts.
It is surely time that someone set the example. This is the first com-
mandment and the second is to say and do something about it.
The law is not a game, played by unmorals with the lives and
properties of animate pawns, and this is true whether we are agents in
private brawls or clothed with the "little brief authority" of public
office. The accolade of office is not a license to pettifog.
'Tis excellent to have a giant's strength,
But it is tyrannous to use it like a giant."
The law, as you know, is a high calling demanding the best that
man can give. According to De Tocqueville, the American aristocracy
occupies the bench and bar. Our profession is not a sordid business and
should not be viewed primarily as the means of livelihood. It has been
called a "jealous mistress," but I prefer a more domestic simile. One
should marry the law. He should pay to it the respect and honor which
the church enjoins on those who enter into matrimony. A lawyer, like
a husband, should first of all be a gentleman, which connotes among
other things certain fixed values.
What are life's values in the law? Well, we still pay lip service to
"life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." This not being a Fascist
state, life is reasonably secure. The pursuit of happiness is a euphemism.
Liberty exists within the realm of definition, a football for courts, quasi-
courts and legislatures.
"We are under a Constitution," I quote Chief Justice, then Gov-
ernor Hughes, "but the Constitution is what judges say it is."
Liberty meant one thing to Chief Justice Marshall, something else
to Chief Justice Taney. Constitutional powers and limitations have
been measured by different rods. Until recently the yardstick has had
length of life sufficient for a modicum of adjustment. Not so today, as
evidence a recent dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, in which
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, to the astonishment of the lay press, concurred.
I repeat, it is time for a restatement of values. Negation has gone
far enough. It gets us no place. This is largely your job. Mind you, I
am not suggesting that we turn back the hands of the clock, that the
social or other gains of the last decade be abandoned, or that we adopt
the medieval political philosophy exemplified by certain pseudo-states-
men. I do not assert that whatever is is right, nor that whatever is new
is by that fact better than the old. But, and it is a big BUT, let us have
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some definite, certain values, be they what they may. Let us have values
which, being with us today, we may expect to have with us tomorrow.
As the limerick has it, "this walking around without touching the
ground is getting to be quite a bore."
Perhaps I should be more specific. There was a time when, despite
the unsettling effect of the extension of the police power, a lawyer could
advise his client with reasonable assurance respecting constitutional limi-
tations. This has not been true for at least ten years. St. Paul may have
had this decade in mind when he wrote to his protege, Timothy, "Desir-
ing to be teachers of the law: understanding neither what they say, nor
whereof they affirm." And again in Hebrews 7-12: "For the priesthood
being changed, there is made of necessity a change also of the law."
As long ago as 1934, Professor Corwin, writing of and in the
Twilight of the Supreme Court, made the following astonishing state-
ment, citing 232 U. S. 548, at 558, as his authority:
"Today," he said, "the protection afforded by the 'obligation of
contracts' clause has been to a great extent absorbed into that general
principle of judicial discretion wherein all constitutional restraints have
tended latterly to lose identity."
Think of it, and that was ten years ago' There are those who
carry Professor Corwin's thesis down to date by saying that if there was
twilight in 1934 there has been a black-out since.
Now, if all constitutional restraints tend to lose their identity i,n
the general principle of judicial discretion, what is there left that is solid?
The Constitution becomes fluid. Its constraints evaporate, leaving only
a mirage.
"The Constitution," said Governor Hughes, "is what the judges
say it is." But Mr. Justice Black says that the Constitution does not
mean what Mr. Justice Frankfurter says and vice versa, ad infinitum.
In the current issue of the American Bar Association Journal nine-
teen decisions of the Supreme Court are reviewed and in ten there were
dissents. In one there were three separate dissenting opinions, possibly
four, in another two together with an opinion dissenting from one of
the dissenting opinions. There is here an exception taken to "the error
of interpreting legislative enactments on the basis of a court's precon-
ceived views on 'morals' and 'ethics'." This, however, is precisely what
is done from time to time both by the learned authors of the anamadver-
sion and those at whom it was aimed. It is, in fact, the necessary result
of absorbing clauses of the Constitution into the "general principle of
judicial discretion."
We can but hope that out of this "confusion worse confounded"
there will emerge some measure of stability, some reasonably certain cri-
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teria by which we may be guided out of the "dark and dreary wood"
of constitutional chaos where we now wander falteringly like lost souls.
When we leave the domain of the traditional tribunals of justice
and enter into that of the sacrosanct administrative agencies, words fail
us. As members of the bar we are under compulsion to respect the courts,
but we are under no such compulsion with respect to those excrescences
in the body of the law, those executive vampires who mock justice as
they let its blood.
Here we enter a door marked "Hysteria," so let it pass. Suffice it to
say that you young men in the law will deserve the everlasting thanks
of present and future generations if in honest thought and courageous
speech and action you scotch this snake.
Yet I would not have you think that I question the good faith or
motives of those who "mock justice" in their bureaucratic activities. By
and large they are honest, forward looking men, imbued with liberalism,
altruism, not to mention other isms.
. But they have the faults of their virtues, not the least being the idea
that the end justifies the means-a concept, by the bye, which con,
sciously or unconsciously is currently dictating the trend of world, as
well as of juridical events.
Neither do my somewhat harsh reflections apply by any means to
all or even to most administrative agencies. There are many excellent
men doing splendid work in this field. But, and here is another big But
-a chain is no stronger than its weakest link. These good and able men
suffer from the errors of their lesser brethren. In fact they probably suf-
fer as victims quite as much as does the public. Furthermore, that there
are good and able men, and young men, in administrative agencies is
demonstrated by the number who are leaving to reenter private practice.
They just can't take it. And won't, thank God.
Now what are you going to do about it? Nothing? I doubt it.
The interest which young men in the law are taking in the affairs of the
organized bar as well as in all other important activities today negates
'nothing."
In you we see the future justices, judges, legislators, aye, even pres-
idents (providing you outlive Methuselah). It is your Vision, your re-
statement of values, your courageous exemplification of the dignity of
the law, upon which depend life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness
in the republic (democratic, of course) in which we proudly live.
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Murder On The Range
By IVOR 0. WINGREN*
It was early June in the year 1917. Juan Chavez, the pride and
joy of his father, Jesus Chavez, the foreman of the big sheep ranch on
the Rio Conejos, down on the border between Colorado and New
Mexico, soon would be sixteen years old. For a number of years Juan's
father had taken Juan with him up to the high range to teach him how
to handle the sheep. He had taught him how to make and break camp,
where to bed down the sheep, and the vigilance necessary to keep the
coyotes away. It had been great fun to camp out in the big, comfortable
sheep wagon, and to watch the well trained sheep dog herd the sheep.
This year Juan alone would be the herder on the high range. It
would be a little lonesome for him, up there in the high range by him-
self, but he would have the dog for company, the 30:30 rifle for protec-
tion, and every week-end his father, or Big John Smith, the owner of
the ranch, would bring up fresh supplies and help to move camp. All of
these things, and most especially what he would do with the thirty
dollars a month he would receive as the pay of a full-fledged sheepherder,
Juan contemplated with enthusiasm.
At last the eventful day arrived, and Juan and the band of sheep
moved off of the ranch for the high range. His father went with him
and, after a week's journey, at a pace to accommodate the weakest lamb
and the oldest ewe, they arrived at the first camp ground, some fifty
miles from the home ranch. As he watched his father disappear over the
ridge on his way back to the ranch, Juan felt a little lonesome, but he
had the dog for company, the gun, and the well larded sheep wagon;
and in a day or two his pride in knowing that he was doing a man's
work overcame his loneliness. It was fun to pick a high point and sit
and watch the sheep and send the dog on his various errands of turning
the sheep back, or starting them on a different course; and he enjoyed
lying on his back among the sage brush, or on the pine needles and
watching the lazy clouds float by.
Thus, several weeks passed, his father bringing up the supplies on
Saturday afternoon and staying overnight. Other than his father, Juan
had seen only the forest ranger, who passed by occasionally, and a young
doctor, E. K. Shelton, who had only recently settled in the little town
over the mountain in New Mexico, and who had come by riding on his
horse from the little town of Antonito, where he had visited his young
lawyer friend, Ralph L. Carr, to tell Carr that in a few weeks he would
be leaving for the army. The doctor had stopped and looked over the
*Of the Denver bar.
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sheep, and had helped to prepare and eat lunch. Juan had had a terrible
headache that day, and the doctor had given him a few aspirin tablets
to take for relief.
On the following Saturday, Juan's father did not come up with
the supplies; instead, the owner of the ranch, Big John Smith, brought
them. As Juan's father had told Smith that the boy was taking good
care of the sheep, Smith was very disappointed, and in his disappoint-
ment vigorously upbraided Juan and warned him that if he did not
attend to his duties better he would be sent home. On his return to the
ranch, Smith told Juan's father what had occurred.
The following Saturday, Juan's father went to the sheep camp
with the supplies. What a shock awaited him! The sheep were scat-
tered; Juan and the dog were in the sheep wagon, Juan delirious and
dying, his body covered with black and blue spots. As he lay dying in
his father's arms, the only words Juan was able to utter were "sheep"
and "Smith."
The boy had died in New Mexico, and the grief-stricken father
hastened to the sheriff in the nearest New Mexico town and there related
his story. Suspicion at once pointed to Smith. It was apparent he had
beaten the boy so badly that he had died from the beating.
Smith was promptly arrested, .taken before the local justice of the
peace, charged with murder, and held without bail. The feeling against
Smith ran high, and lynching parties were freely mentioned. Later,
when the more sober-minded 'members of the community were in con-
trol, Smith was permitted to send for his lawyer, Ralph L. Carr. When
Carr interviewed his client, Smith assured him that he had not laid a
hand on the young man, and that there must be some terrible mistake.
Carr then went to the coroner's office to view the body, and noted that
although the body was covered with black and blue spots, the skin was
not broken. He remembered that his young doctor friend had been
making a study of vermin transmitted fevers, and sent for him. Together
they examined the body, and the young doctor called Carr aside and
whispered in his ear.
Carr called for a preliminary hearing, at which Dr. Shelton testi-
fied that the wood ticks had been especially bad that year, and that Juan
had died from Rocky Mountain spotted fever. Reluctantly the justice
discharged the defendant. Carr had won his first murder case.t
,This is a true story, vouched for by former Governor Ralph L. Carr and Judge
Joseph Thomas, of Antonito, Colorado. The names of the rancher and the Mexican
sheepherder are for obvious reasons fictitious.
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Consider Victoria
By CHARLES J. BEISE*
When the spotlight of international comment has been focused
upon a provision of the Constitution of the State of Colorado, it be-
hooves us, in turn, to look in the direction of the source of light. Par-
ticularly is this true in these days when our young men are becoming
personally acquainted with many of the nations of the world and allied
good-will efforts are the order of the day.
Consider, then, the State of Victoria, Commonwealth of Australia,
which leads that continent in irrigation development, and whose prob-
lems are much the same as ours. Victoria did us the honor as far back as
1884 of commenting upon Article 16, Section 5, of the Colorado Con-
stitution. A Royal Commission on Water Supply under the chairman-
ship of the Honorable Alfred Deakin prepared a report to Parliament
showing what had been done in the Western States. The report gave
special attention to
the legal difficulties that had so greatly handicapped and retarded
the full utilization of its water resources. The water laws of the
various American States were compared and attention was drawn
to the marked advantage enjoyed by the State of Colorado, whose
Constitution embodied the provision that "all streams within its
boundaries were * * * declared to be public property."
These recommendations and the "Colorado Doctrine" of use and own-
ership of water have played a major role in the development of Victorian
water law and have made possible the development of that State at a
time when all irrigation was threatened by the riparian doctrine.
Prior to the passage of the IRRIGATION ACT of 1886,1 Victoria
honored the doctrine of riparian rights. However, it was and is recog-
itized that:
Of the purposes to which water may be applied the most impor-
tant is the primary natural purpose of quenching the thirst of man
and beast, washing and cooking, and the like. These wants must,
in all events, be first satisfied. The next purpose in order 'of na-
tional importance is, in this State, that of irrigation. The claims
and needs of mining, manufacturing and even of navigation must
*Of the Colorado bar. Attorney for the United States Bureau of Reclamation at
Salt Lake City, Utah.
'All of the.references to Victorian Law are based on VICTORIAN WATER LAW,
being an extract from evidence presented to Victorian Parliamentary Public Works
Committee by L. R. East, Chairman of State Rivers and Water Supply Commission,
January 12, 1943.
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here, as in many American States, be subordinated to those of
irrigation.'
Early in the history of Victoria the matter of maximum beneficial use
received attention, and by the Land Act of 1869 provision was made
for the permanent reservation of Crown lands for public purposes.'
Even before this, in 1862, a bill was introduced 4 making water in excess
of domestic requirements public property and subject to governmental
authorized appropriation. The bill failed to pass. By the Land Act of
1869, the Governor was authorized to reserve from sale Crown lands,
needed for irrigation, and in 188 1 many lakes, rivers, inlets and water-
courses were withdrawn. In 1884 a commission on water supply was
appointed that made various recommendations which were the basis of
the Victorian WATER CONSERVATION ACT OF 1886.6 The outstanding
feature of the 1886 act was the abolition of practically all riparian rights
and the nationalization of all surface waters.7 Although the act pre-
vented acquisition of riparian rights after its passage, it did not define
existing riparian rights and it was not until 1905 that the status of
'Not a Victorian statute, but a statement of Mr. East. Irrigation as a preferred use
over power is a prime essential for the West today and the basis of contention over
A.V.A. and other power acts.
'Honorable James Mackenzie Grant, Minister of Lands, stated "the government
should be empowered from time to time to prohibit settlement within what may be
called the lines of these great. irrigation works." The United States, nearly twenty years
later, adopted the same policy by the Acts of October 2, 1888, 25 STAT. 505, and
August 30, 1890, 26 STAT. 371, reserving reservoir sites and rights of way for ditches
and canals constructed by the United States.
'The United States by the Act of July 26, 1866 (43 U. S. C. A. §661), ac-
knowledged local customs, laws and decisions which had the same effect in the West.
'The United States adopted the same principle by the Act of June 25, 1910, 36
STAT. 847, 43 U. S. C. A. §141, Act of June 17, 1902, 32 STAT. 388.
"'Recommendation IV * * * care to be taken for maintenance and protection
of the public right in the waters of all rivers-with authority under proper legal sanc-
tion for the division of their waters for the public good.-It is essential that the State
should exercise the supreme control of ownership over all rivers, lakes, streams and
sources of water supply." Again it was stated-- Private enterprise has already accom-
plished something in the provision of water for both purposes: (domestic and irriga-
tion) but, although the enterprise of individual landholders has often proved sufficient
for the construction of dams and tanks and the weiring and diversion of minor creeks,
it will be inadvisable to give them control of our larger rivers."7
1,Section 4. The right to the use of all water at any time in any river, stream,
watercourse, lake, lagoon, swamp or marsh shall for the purposes of this Act in every
case be deemed to be vested in the Crown until the contrary be proved by establishing
any other right than that of the Crown to the use of such water, and save in the exercise
of any legal right existing at the time of such diversion or appropriation no person shall
divert or appropriate any water from any river, stream, watercourse, lake, lagoon, swamp
or marsh excepting under the provisions of this Act or of some other Act already or
hereafter to be passed, except in the exercise of the general right of all persons to use
water for domestic and stock supply from any river, stream, watercourse, lake, lagoon.
swamp or marsh vested in the Crown, and to which there is access by a public road or
reserve."
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riparian rights were defined.8 Certain minor changes were made in 1928
and again in 1937, but today the right to the use, flow and control of
natural streams is vested in the Crown and where access is provided by
road, any person may take water for domestic and ordinary use and to
water cattle. A riparian owner has these same rights and in some cases
the right to irrigate a garden. However, the riparian owner has no abso-
lute right to such water, but only to such as is available after the exercise
by an authority of the powers conferred upon it for storage or diversion.
It is a matter of opinion as to whether or not Victoria's system is
superior to Colorado's. The writer is certainly not competent to pass
such an opinion, but it is interesting to note the opinion of KINNEY
published in 1912:0
Australia has done in the history of her irrigation practice
what the western states of this country should have done, or,
rather, what our Federal Government should have done many years
ago-it being then the owner of all public lands-and that is, it
has fixed the status of ownership in and to waters and has pre-
scribed the exact conditions under which the water may be used.
In our own country this was left largely to the individual. And
by this means, enormous profit making corporations have sprung
up which own and distribute much of our waters; endless litiga-
tion has been and is being caused; and at all times the rights of the
consumers are more or less unsettled. And, strange as it may seem,
Australia learned many lessons from the conditions in this country.
In turn, it is not too late for us to learn many lessons from Aus-
tralia.
Since the creation of the State Rivers and Water Supply Commis-
sion in 1905 (the first chairman was Dr. Elwood Mead, later Commis-
sioner of the United States Bureau of Reclamation) there have been built
thirty-four large reservoirs and a great number of smaller basins with a
combined total storage capacity of approximately two million acre feet;
14,000 miles of channels in rural sections and 700 miles of pipelines in
urban sections providing domestic and stock supplies to an area of fifteen
million acres composed of 50,000 separate rural holdings, the greater
"'Section 4. The right to the use and flow and to the control of the water at any
time in any river, creek, stream or watercourse and in any lake, lagoon, swamp or marsh
shall subject only to the restrictions hereinafter provided and until appropriated under
the sanction of this Act or of some existing or future Act of Parliament vest in the
Crown."
"Section 5. Where any river, creek, stream or watercourse or any lake forms the
boundary or part of the boundary of an allotment of land * * * the bed and banks
thereof shall be deemed to have remained the property of the Crown and not to have
passed with the land so alienated."
91 KINNEY, IRRIGATION t' WATER RIGHTS (2d ed. 1912) 203.
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part of which could not have been developed without this aid.' 0 The
matter of post-war construction, as in the United States, is receiving the
studied attention of the Commission.
11
"WATER SUPPLY PROBLEMS IN VICTORIA, July, 1939, by L. R. EAST, Chair-
man State Rivers and Water Supply Commission.
"THE FINANCING OF DEVELOPMENTAL WORKS, 1943, Published by State Riv-
ers and Water Supply Commission.
Humorous or Pathetic? We Leave It To You
AGREEMENT FOR SUIT
, Plaintiff, versus ......... ............ and others, D efendants.
I, the undersigned. . ................. ............. C lient, hereby apply to
- -Attorney, to represent me in the District Court
of the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado, Case No ...............
Div .......... (said Number is assigned by the Court the day after fil-
ing said suit). In making this Application I agree to the following of
my own free will and act.
1. That I have read completely, or have same read to me, and
understand fully each and every of the terms of this AGREEMENT
before signing the same.
2. T hat I fully understand and agree that . ................. . ........
Attorney, cannot and does not guarantee to win any case; and specifi-
cally cannot and does not guarantee to win this case. All I ask is that
said Attorney do all he can in my behalf.
3. That I fully understand and agree that this is a DISPUTED
and DIFFICULT CASE, for reasons set forth on the third page of this
AGREEMENT, and is a case to be settled by the Court, and that the
only duty of the Attorney is to present my side of the case as best he can,
under all the circumstances, and is not to be held responsible for the out-
come of the case. That I have full confidence in his honesty, integrity
and fairness: otherwise I would not ask him to represent me in Court.
4. I fully understand and agree that no lawyer can properly guar-
antee to win any case in Court. No lawyer knows how a Court or Jury
will decide; that all clients must in all cases take that risk, and the client
is not to question the honor or integrity of the Court, nor of her At-
torney.
5. I fully agree to accept the decision of the Court, or verdict of
the Jury without question; unless I appeal to the Supreme Court of the
State of Colorado within the time limit, as explained to me by the Court
and by my Attorney.
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6. I fully agree that in case of Appeal, this Agreement shall be
supplemented by another AGREEMENT FOR APPEAL, and the
terms of payment of fees and commission, or either of them, and the
payments of the Costs of Appeal shall be separate and apart and in
addition to the terms of this Agreement.
7. I fully understand and agree to pay all Court costs in advance,
or as they become due and payable, according to the following schedule,
insofar as they can be set forth in advance.
See Schedule on second page.
I understand that the Attorney does not pay Court costs.
8. I fully understand and agree that, under the law, this case may
be continued from time to time, by the Court, or by either side for good
cause shown, satisfactory to the Court.
9. I fully understand and agree that in every law suit, unless com-
promised or settled before trial, one side must win, and one side must
lose. That Courts and Lawyers are presumed to be honest, and do the
best they can, under all the circumstances of the case, to arrive at a fair
and impartial decision, and that neither Courts nor Lawyers are sup-
posed to buy or sell law suits. I understand this law suit is a dispute
between me and the other parties defendant, and not a dispute between
the Lawyers or Courts.
10. I fully understand and agree that it is my duty-and not the
duty of the Attorney-to furnish the evidence; to answer all questions
of the Attorney in trying to get the facts of the case; to get the witnesses
to the Attorney's office for interviews, when requested; to have wit-
.nesses served with subpoenas, and to pay witnesses when necessary; to
furnish receipts, records and other papers and documents, etc., under the
direction of my Attorney, as and when requested by him.
11. I fully understand and agree that if a compromise or offer of
settlement is made, it is my duty-and not my Attorney's duty-to
decide to accept or reject it after consulting my Attorney; and when ac-
cepted or rejected, I agree to be wholly responsible for the outcome, in
Court or otherwise; that in the event of settlement or compromise, I
agree to pay the costs and fees as herein outlined and agreed upon, the
same as if the case had been tried in Court.
12. I hereby agree that my Attorney is empowered to perform the
said services for and on behalf of me as Client, and to do all things neces-
sary, appropriate or advisable, which the said Attorney may deem nec-
essary, appropriate or advisable in this Suit.
13. Both the Attorney and Client will use their best efforts in fur-
thering this Suit and in obtaining the necessary evidence and the attend-
ance of witnesses.
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14. As compensation for the services of the Attorney, as a Re-
tainer, in starting this said Suit, I, the Client, agree to and do pay the
sum of Five Dollars ($5.00) for the drawing up of the Complaint, and
the Summons and Lis Pendens, and in supervising the service of same
and the filing of same. In addition thereto I agree to pay the stenographic
fee of 25c per hour, which is estimated not to exceed the sum of $2.00
for said Complaint, Summons and Lis Pendens.
15. I hereby agree to pay the following initial Costs:
Filing of Complaint-Docket Fee -- -- $13.50
Filing of Lis Pendens with Clerk and Recorder. 1.00
Service of various Summons -- ?-
Summons cannot be served by Attorney nor any interested party
to this suit. They may be served by the Sheriff or by any disinterested
friend of Plaintiff, who may or may not charge for same. Such party
must make Affidavit of Service and Client must pay for the Notary Fee.
If Summons is sworn to before the Clerk of the Court there is no
additional fee. If before a Notary Public here -------------- $ .25
Same is true as to swearing to Complaint ------------------------------ .25
After Suit is properly instituted, filed and Summons and Complaint
served on various Defendants, any one or more of them may file Motions
or Demurrers, which must be either confessed and furnished or set down
and heard before the Judge, before the case can be tried on its merits.
These necessitate the looking up of the law on such Motions or Demur-
rers and the appearance of the Attorney in Court for Argument, which
oftentimes take a half to a whole day extra in Court. For such appear-
ances in Court I agree to pay the Additional Fee of Five Dollars ($5.00)
each.
When the Suit comes on for trial, there is much necessary prepara-
tion beforehand, and the appearance in Court. from one half to one or
more days. For each half day in Court I agree to pay the sum, in addi-
tion to above, of Five Dollars ($5.00).
In addition to the above fees, I agree to pay a sum equal to 25%
on any amount recovered, over and above the Costs of said Suit, that is,
the 25% is reckoned on the net amount recovered. In the event the said
percentage amount to the sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) then
it is agreed that the above Retainers shall be absorbed and included in the
said percentage as above stated.
16. It is fully understood that said Attorney has done a large
amount of preliminary work in looking up the law, in making trips to
the Court House, and to my home, etc., and in the event this AGREE-
MENT is not signed in full as above and this Suit is not filed as outlined
above, then and in that event I agree to and do pay to the said Attorney
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the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) in full Satisfaction and Payment for
said preliminary services, and both parties are then relieved of further
work or consideration of said Suit.
17. I hereby agree to advance all said fees, as they become due as
above stated, and to pay all necessary costs and expenses incident to the
performance of said services, such as gas, oil, etc., and to pay any neces-
sary Court costs or stenographic services as may be necessary and re-
quired.
18. This per cent as above set forth shall cover any money or
property received or collected, by suit, compromise or settlement or oth-
erwise, upon or in satisfaction of any claim, or recovery made, incident
to, or as a result of, the said services of said Attorney.
19. This retainer and commissions shall be irrevocable, insofar as
it may lawfully be made such, and the discharge or attempted discharge
of the said Attorney, or the sale, assignment, transfer or encumbrance of
claim or right of recovery, or the proceeds thereof, or any judgment
thereon, whether resulting from his services or otherwise, shall not affect
nor destroy his right and interest in the claim, right of recovery, the
proceeds thereof, or judgment thereon. This retainer and commissions
shall operate as an assignment, for the amounts stated above, to said
Attorney as above outlined.
20. I fully understand and agree that this particular suit is against
several different Defendants, each of whom have or claim different claims
against me as Client and Plaintiff; that there are several different causes
of action, which are difficult to combine in one suit; that with so many
defendants representing different interests, there will no doubt be several
different attorneys or firms of attorneys appearing for the various De-
fendants, which will make it necessary for my Attorney to do more work
than where there is just one Plaintiff and one Defendant. That my said
property is behind in taxes to such an extent that there may be nothing
to recover, even though my Attorney should win as against one or more
of the Defendants. That the two Quit Claim Deeds between me and
--- or ---------------------------------- do not state that they
were to pay my taxes as a part of the consideration for my Quit Claim
Deed, thus making it difficult for my Attorney to prepare as strong a
case in my behalf as if such consideration was definitely stated; that by
reason of the possibility of long delay in getting a case of this kind to
speedy trial, it would be unfair to ask my Attorney to depend wholly
upon the uncertainty of a commission or percentage fee. That this para-
graph sets forth some of the difficulties in an Attorney undertaking a
case of this nature, and, therefore, is entitled to some Retainer as the
case develops.
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21. For and in consideration of the above AGREEMENTS, UN-
DERSTANDINGS and UNDERTAKINGS on the part of the CLI-
ENT, I, the undersigned ATTORNEY, do hereby agree to undertake,
to the best of my ability, as ATTORNEY, to represent said CLIENT
in the above entitled cause. READ IN FULL BY BOTH ATTOR-
NEY and CLIENT before signing in Duplicate at Denver, Colorado,
this - day of ,--- - A. D . .........
CLIENT
--------------------------- -------- - - A T T O RN E Y
WITNESSES:
(The foregoing contract was submitted, but not prepared, by
CHARLES W. SHELDON, JR., of the Denver bar.)
Jobs For Lawyers
The Placement Bureau of the Colorado Bar Association
has recently had more requests for attorneys for legal positions
than it has been able to fill. It is our belief that in the imme-
date future there will be additional requests. The number of
applicants registered with the Placement Bureau has steadily
declined, so that at the present time practically every previous
applicant has been afforded the opportunity for legal em-
ployment.
Many of the requests are for attorneys with experience.
This notice is to urge all attorneys who wish to secure other
legal employment to register with the Bureau immediately.
This suggestion is not simply for recent law school graduates,
but is also for attorneys with varying degrees of experience.
It is also our belief that the number of applications from
lawyers returning from active service will also increase in the
near future. For this reason, we urge all law offices that now
need or will need the services of associates to make their needs
known to the Bureau.
MARK H. HARRINGTON,
Chairman of the Placement Bureau.
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A Problem of Multiple Residences




International law poses the difficult problem of dual citizenship.
This problem is, however, as simple as a 1914 income tax return
when compared with the one presented by the second sentence of (1)
of Section 13, Article VI, of the by-laws of The Colorado Bar Associ-
ation. *
Which of the four vice-presidents is currently residing in each of
the four congressional districts? And will the election of March 7 next
change this situation?
Yours very truly,
BENJAMIN C. HILLIARD, JR.
*The part of the by-laws referred to follows:
"Section 13. The officers of the Association shall be as follows: (1) A Presi-
dent, a President-Elect, and four Vice-Presidents to be elected at the annual meeting.
One of the four Vice-Presidents shall be a resident of each congressional district. * * *"
To celebrate the first anniversary of the establishment of the legal
assistance offices in the army, approximately fifty lawyers from the army
and from civilian ranks met at a dinner in the Shirley-Savoy Hotel on
March 16, 1944. Officers from each of the camps in Colorado and from
the Office of Dependency Benefits were present.
The meeting was held under the auspices of the Lawyers' War
Emergency Committee of the Colorado Bar Association, of which Ben
E. Sweet is chairman. Presiding at the meeting was Stephen Park Kin-
ney, chairman of the state bar committee on legal aid.
No formal speeches were delivered at the dinner, but various army
officers and Frazer Arnold, Regional Director of the American Bar
Association's Committee on War Work, spoke briefly on various phases
of the program.
Milton E. Blake of Denver represented his son, Lt. Col. Milton
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